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Chapter 11
Retirement Guarantees in Mandatory
Defined Contribution Systems
Jan Walliser
Risk protection for retirees has become one of the centerpieces of the debate
how to organize retirement systems. The global push for a larger role for
defined-contribution (DC) plans has raised the question how retirees should
be protected from capital market risk. Proponents of individual investment
pension accounts often consider these risks to be as easily manageable and
far outweighed by the opportunities offered by a DC system. Opponents
contend that the risks of individual investment are large and that defined-
benefit (DB) pension systems are more appropriate for mandatory public
systems.
Notwithstanding the merits of both arguments, all implementations of
mandatory public DC plans around the world in fact feature some form
of guarantee. In some cases, the government maintains a public benefit
independent of past contribution and wage history (‘‘flat benefit’’); in
others, it tops up retirement savings. Some systems also offer guaran-
tees on the rate of return of retirement savings.1 Protecting retirees from
poverty is a driving force behind the discussion on appropriate retirement
guarantees.
Guarantees are neither free nor cheap. From an economic viewpoint, the
guarantor faces the costs of these guarantees ex ante, even though they may
only rarely require outlays. The allocation and management of risks crucially
affects the extent to which extent retirement income can be effectively pre-
funded and the extent to which taxpayers are exposed to changes in the
size of retiree cohorts (Smetters, 2001). Hence, the risk aspect has macro-
economic implications. Moreover, interventions by the guarantor may have
behavioral impacts because participants have the tendency to expand their
risk exposure if a third party guarantees these risks. Providing as much
up-front information as possible to policymakers about macroeconomic
and behavioral implications guarantees is therefore an important task for
economists.
Kent Smetters provided helpful comments and advice. The opinions expressed in the chapter
are those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank.
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This chapter discusses guarantees offered under mandatory public pen-
sion systems around the world.2 To set the stage, the next section outlines
interactions between guarantees and strategies to limit governments’ risk
exposure. The important conclusion is that the evaluation of these guaran-
tees must go hand in hand with the regulation and design of the underlying
public DC system. Next we compare a number of actual implementations of
guarantees and analyze their particular risk allocation and risk management
mechanisms. A final section concludes.
Retirement Guarantees: Understanding their
Costs and Managing their Risks
Retirement guarantees come in two basic forms: contingent payments, and
noncontingent payments. The first category includes benefits based on an
income or means tests as well as minimum rate of return guarantees. The
second category includes benefits that are paid independent of incomes
and rates of return, such as the so-called flat pension.
The financial impact of noncontingent payments can be more easily
assessed, because the process does not involve evaluating risks that the
government may be assuming on behalf of the individual. To take the uni-
versal flat benefit as an example, its costs depend largely on fairly easily
predictable demographic developments, since everybody above a certain
age would receive an identical benefit. If an inflation-protected flat benefit
is set sufficiently high, it also automatically protects people from poverty.
However, it would be poorly targeted and would require pending consider-
able resources on people who are far above any notion of the poverty line.
The economic impact of noncontingent payments is similar to giving people
an additional safe asset. This additional safe asset would entice people to
increase their holdings of risky assets and to increase their risk exposure.
However, if the government could credibly commit to not increase its assist-
ance in case of poor investment outcomes, these behavioral adaptations
would have no repercussion on the cost of the income guarantee, since
payments are independent of outcomes.
The case is more complicated for contingent payments. A danger of such
guarantees is that their cost is not at all or only partially recognized by
policymakers, since ‘‘on average’’ guarantees are not being called. It may
therefore appear that the costs of these guarantees would be negligible.
However, Smetters (1998, 2001, 2002) has demonstrated, a market-based
evaluation of the value of guarantees along the line of the Black--Scholes
(1973) option price formula can imply large unfunded liabilities. These
calculations exploit the fact that a guarantee can be interpreted as an option
to receive a payment if the value of retirement assets or the rate of return falls
below a certain threshold. Lachane and Mitchell (Chapter 8, this volume)
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provide an overview over the costs of guarantees and the implications of
alternative financing strategies.
The intuition for this result derives from the observation that economic
agents are generally averse to risk. Even though the probability to be penni-
less during retirement may be virtually zero, many people would probably
pay a considerable amount of money to have a guarantee against that out-
come. It would therefore be wrong to equate the expected value of the
payments made under the guarantee with the ex ante value of providing the
guarantee.
Merton and Bodie (1992) provide a useful framework for the manage-
ment of risks generated by guarantees. They discuss three tools to manage
these risks: monitoring risks, pricing guarantees, and imposing restrictions
on assets. In the case of government retirement guarantees, these tools
are of different applicability. Monitoring risks involves reviewing portfolios
on a regular basis, marking them to market, and seizing assets or inter-
vening in the activity of the guaranteed entity when the asset level moves
dangerously close to one at which the guarantee will be activated. In the
case of relatively small individual portfolios, it is virtually impossible for
the government to monitor performance. Moreover, monitoring is subject
to considerable arbitrariness. An agency charged with monitoring perform-
ance could acquire considerable power through its ability to intervene when
risks are considered to be too large for the guaranteed entity (i.e. the
pension fund or individual investor) to continue making decisions on its
portfolio.
It would also be difficult to move to the ex ante pricing of guarantees,
i.e. in form of an insurance premium paid to the government, since the
latter would need to be based on individual circumstances given that each
individual has a different portfolio and risk exposure.3 In view of the diffi-AQ: Please
check
footnotes 3
and 4 are
not cited in
the text so
the
footnotes 5
& 6 are
changed to
3 & 4 and
onwards
culties with individual monitoring and pricing of risks, a third way to limit
exposure is to restrict portfolio investments. By regulating the composi-
tion of investment portfolios, the government can reduce the volatility of
outcomes, limit moral hazard, and reduce the risk that guarantee payments
must be made. At the same time, the exact specifications of asset restrictions
will have ramifications on investment choices and thus may involve efficiency
losses. The same problem of choice arises if the government decides to spe-
cify a ‘‘benchmark portfolio’’ with ‘‘acceptable’’ risk exposure to be covered
by the government guarantee, with additional risk must be borne by the
individual.4
What are the practical implications of the above? First, guarantees are
costly and their costs play an important role in designing DC pension sys-
tems. Second, government risk exposure can be limited through applying
one or several instruments of risk management. Third, the ultimate mix
between individual risk exposure, government guarantees, and government
regulation, determines the viability of the pension system in the long term.
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On the one hand, exposing too many retirees to the risk of poverty in old
age will erode participant support for the pension system. On the other
hand, too generous government guarantees or lack of appropriate risk man-
agement for guarantees can undermine government finances, and in the
end they may lead to the same problem of sustainability faced by many
pay-as-you-go systems.5
Retirement Guarantees around the World
What can retirement guarantees promise? The short answer is as much or
as little as can be credibly committed to pay in case the guarantees are being
called. The combination of promise and risk-management mechanism dif-
fers by country, but in looking at a variety of countries, some general patterns
emerge. Table 11-1 summarizes key aspects of guarantees in national man-
datory DC schemes. Next, we discuss three broad arrangements, along with
more detailed reference to a few specific country cases.
The British Model and its Derivatives
The British pension model is characterized by a relatively high level of
individual responsibility and the concomitant fairly high level of risk that
remains with individual investors. Income support from the government is
limited to a flat payment, conditional on the worker satisfying an extended
period of coverage and contributions. The individual is largely left to fend
for himself while retaining a large variety of investment choice. The addition
of a second DB layer to the flat benefit dates only from 1975 (the so-called
state earnings related pension scheme (SERPS)), and people can opt out
through funded occupational or personal pension plans. Neither occupa-
tional nor personal pensions are subject to strict investment regulations,
with most regulatory efforts concentrated on ensuring that people receive
accurate investment advice.6
As a result of the UK government’s commitment to a limited and non-
contingent floor of protection, its risk exposure is limited to demographic
change. Therefore, the freedom to invest that was left to workers does
not create a contingent government liability. In this respect, the guarantee
would appear to be a minimum pension promise, which the government
could probably afford to keep. But, under current projections, the flat bene-
fit is projected to decline from about 15 percent of average earnings in the
mid-1990s to about 9 percent of average earnings by 2030, largely on account
of a lack of adjustment for productivity growth (Budd and Campbell, 1998).
By reducing the size of the benefit in relative terms and thus reducing the
generosity of the guarantee in terms of average earnings, the British govern-
ment seeks to encourage more funding and risktaking, while simultaneously
reducing the relative size of the noncontingent guarantee. The main chal-
lenge for this strategy flows from uncertainty over the political consequences
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of shifting most of the responsibility to prepare and invest for retirement
to individuals. It may happen that people making poor investment choices
end up with lower retirement income than under SERPS and pressure the
government to raise guaranteed benefits.
The Australian Superannuation System
The Australian system also originally limited old-age support to a relatively
low government benefit and largely left individuals to prepare for their
own retirement. In contrast to the United Kingdom, the income guaran-
tee was means-tested and thus contingent on investment returns and labor
earnings. This basic pillar is financed out of general revenue and not as
a result of a contributory scheme, as under the British system. A mandat-
ory funded second pillar was introduced in the 1990s, which relies mostly
on employer-controlled ‘‘superannuation’’ funds. Most of these funds are
run by employers and many do not allow individuals to control investment
decisions, so their investment choices tend to be fairly conservative. As a
result, even though the government provides a contingent payment, the
lack of portfolio limits for pension funds does not appear to entice more
risk-taking or pose serious threat to government finances. Nevertheless, the
means-testing provisions of the Australian system combined with the pos-
sibility to withdraw retirement savings in a lump sum could lead people
to run down assets or invest in assets that are not fully considered for the
means test, such as housing. The interaction of the different pillars in the
Australian pension system is discussed in more detail by Piggot and Doyle
(Chapter 5, this volume). Prior to the expansion of superannuation plan
coverage, more than 80 percent of Australian retirees were eligible for a
full or partial government pension. If this trend continues, the mandatory
funded second pillar may not have the expected salutary effects on future
retirement income, in which case the means-tested benefit may need to be
scaled back or unfunded spending on old-age support and may crowd out
other government spending.
Provident Funds
Many countries with historical ties to the United Kingdom also adopted the
so-called provident funds, among them, Kenya, Malaysia, and Singapore.
These pool contributions in a mandatory DC fund, managed by the govern-
ment and subject to government investment decisions, and the government
often guarantees a minimum rate of return with its budgetary resources. At
first sight, this may appear to resolve the bulk of the risk management prob-
lem, since the government as guarantor also controls the asset allocation
in the pension fund. But if the minimum rate of return is sufficiently low,
the government may prefer to use provident fund income to finance gov-
ernment operations (by selling government bonds to the fund, or investing
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assets in projects and sectors receiving preferential treatment. The lack of
transparency and exclusion of accountholders from investment decisions
hampers their ability to evaluate investment risks and management acuity,
and it also reduces the responsiveness of investment choices to rate of return
differentials. As a result, provident fund performance has generally been
poor compared with other investment funds, and some provident funds, for
example, in Kenya, have been an almost continuous burden to the budget.
When the government’s financial position is weak, the governments may
take larger risks with fund assets or to finance operations by borrowing from
the fund, and the probability rises that the government may not be able to
make good on its promises. In the extreme case, a provident fund system can
become a pay-as-you-go system, where benefit promises depend entirely on
the government’s overall financial situation. In provident funds, therefore,
the risk is that the government may change the generosity of guarantees.
Reforms in Latin America
A wave of pension reforms started in the 1980s, beginning with the Chilean
reform, and followed by a number of Southern and Central American coun-
tries in the early 1990s.7 Under the Chilean model, workers newly entering
the labor force and those opting out of the old system contribute to a
privately managed pension fund selected from among several competitors.
Workers who chose the new system receive so-called ‘‘recognition bonds’’
for their accrued claims under the old system.
The national Chilean system offers two types of guarantees. The first is a
relative rate of return guarantee for pension investments. In this case, every
participant is guaranteed a minimum annual rate of return no less than
2 percentage points below the average of other pension funds, or less than
half the average rate of return of all pension funds, whichever is greater. If
a pension fund cannot cover the minimum rate of return from its reserves,
the government makes the payment and the pension fund is liquidated.
To minimize the risks from the rate of return guarantee, the government
not only protects investors from downside risks, but it also mandates that
excess returns be held in a profitability reserve. In particular, returns exceed-
ing the average return earned by other funds by more than 2 percentage
points or exceeding twice the average return, whichever is smaller, are not
allocated to individual accounts but kept in reserve. By protecting investors
against downside risks but limiting their participation in upside risks, the
government reduces its own risk exposure. As Smetters (2002) shows, taxing
away good returns is an efficient way to reduce the ex ante value of govern-
ment guarantees. Combined with the asset restrictions placed on portfolios
(described below), this relative rate of return criterion tends to lead insurers
to choose similar portfolios and thus produces limited portfolio choices for
workers in the Chilean system.
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The second form of guarantee in Chile is a minimum pension benefit pay-
ment for those who contribute to the pension system for at least 20 years,
and for whom their individual accounts are too small to finance a minimum
pension of roughly 75 percent of the minimum wage. Thus, long-term work-
ers with too little pension saving receive a topping-up of their pension from
the government, financed out of general government revenue. To reduce
moral hazard, the government has imposed fairly stringent restrictions on
the pension plan portfolio composition, limiting the level of equities and
investments abroad.
As a result of these guarantees and regulation, the Chilean government
participates in both upside and downside risks. By design, all fund managers
have strong incentives to invest in similar portfolios, making large deviations
from the mean a relatively rare outcome. The fact that returns in pension
funds are fairly similar also limits the number of cases with low levels of
retirement savings to those who had low labor incomes during their working
lives, rather than those who made poor investment choices. The major risk
exposure remaining is country-specific risk, in view of the limits imposed
on foreign investments. In particular, the small size of the Chilean economy
combined with the limited portfolio diversification implies that all pension
funds will be exposed in case of national economic difficulties. This would
not trigger the relative rate of return guarantee, but it could eventually
require more topping-up under the minimum pension guarantee.8 The
government could therefore be simultaneously exposed to poor economic
performance and financial pressures generated from the minimum pension
guarantee.
Variations on a theme: Argentina and Mexico
The Argentine system features a minimum rate of return guarantee similar
to the Chilean setup. The main difference is that the relative rate of return
guarantee is asymmetric, such that the provisions are triggered if a fund out-
performs the average by 30 percent or falls short of the average by 70 percent.
This asymmetry leads to larger government participation in upside risks and
lower exposure to downside risk as compared with the Chilean case. The
Argentine system also imposes similar portfolio constraints as the Chilean
system, leading to similar herding behavior in pension funds.
In contrast to the Chilean case, the Argentine government offers a
noncontingent basic pension floor for those having contributed to the man-
datory system for 30 years or more. Worth about 25 percent of the average
wage, this pension floor represents about the same level of income as the
Chilean minimum pension guarantee. Pension portfolio choices therefore
do not expose the government to additional risks and the costs of the flat
benefit are not exposed to country-specific shocks. To the extent that the
participation in upside risks already limits exposure to the minimum rate
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of return guarantee, portfolio restrictions in the Argentine case may be
redundant as compared to Chile. The anticipated costs of the universal
benefit, however, may raise doubts about the government’s ability to finance
the benefit in the long term. Hence, while the government’s contingent
liability may be smaller than in the Chilean case, its overall unfunded liab-
ility appears to be larger, generating larger political uncertainty about the
long-run viability of the benefit.
Recent economic difficulties in Argentina underscore the worry that the
national funded pension system has not insulated pensions from the overall
financial position of the government. In 2001, the government drastically
reduced payroll taxes from 11 to 5 percent, which significantly cut pension
savings inflows. More importantly, the government also obliged pension
funds to buy short-term bonds with long-term deposits and exchanged
public bonds for short-term loans. It then proceeded to convert dollar-
denominated government debt at a rate of Peso 1.40 per US$ compared
with the then-current exchange rate of around Peso 3.5 per US$ (Oxford
Analytica, 2002). These transactions resulted in massive wealth losses for
the pension plans and undermined confidence in the system, resulting in a
sharp decline in contribution rates. As a result of these developments, the
government’s long-run liabilities to pensioners remain high and perhaps
are unsustainable.
In Mexico, the individual account system introduced in 1997 features a
minimum pension guarantee similar to the Chilean setup. By contrast, how-
ever, there is no minimum rate of return guarantee for pension funds and
thus there is no government participation in any upside risk. Nonetheless,
the government is potentially exposed to risky behavior by workers and pen-
sion funds because the Mexican minimum guarantee of about 40 percent
of the average wage is substantially more generous than in Chile. In the
Mexican case, as in Chile and Argentina, the investment risks are limited
through portfolio restrictions imposed on pension fund assets.
It is noteworthy that the differences across systems in Chile, Argentina,
and Mexico---even if they may appear slight---are significant in terms of the
risk distribution between the government and workers, as well as the scope of
reducing government restrictions on investment choices. The Chilean solu-
tion contains government liabilities through participation in upside risks,
self-insurance, and portfolio restrictions, as well as a means test on pension
assets. The Argentine system, while using similar risk management tools,
kept a first-pillar DB program not contingent on investment outcomes,
rather than opting for a means-tested topping-up. Therefore, the unfun-
ded liability of the system is likely larger than in Chile and the rationale
for portfolio restrictions less clear. By contrast, in Mexico, portfolio restric-
tions are a crucial element to limit government risk exposure in light of
the absence of self-insurance against rate of return fluctuations and fairly
generous government minimum benefit guarantees.
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Reforms in Transition Economies
A second generation of pension reforms took place after the transition of
Eastern and Central European countries to market-based economies in the
mid-1990s. These reforms faced different circumstances than in many Latin
American countries, as a result of larger retiree populations and larger
formal labor markets with more substantial unfunded pension liabilities.
As a result of the transition costs involved in moving to funded pension
schemes, most of these countries opted to maintain a larger pay-as-you-
go financed pillar than Latin American reformers (a notable exception is
Kazakhstan).
In Hungary, the 1997 reform revised the existing unfunded DB system
and instituted a mandatory DC pillar, with a contribution rate of 6 percent
of salary. The DB plan continues to provide a replacement rate of about
50 percent, after 40 years of work. In addition to the benefit promised
by the DB system, the Hungarian system offers a rate of return guarantee
for the accounts maintained under the mandatory DC plans, along with a
minimum benefit guarantee equivalent to 25 percent of the DB pension.
This benefit guarantee would be called if pension accounts generate less
than an average annual real rate of return of about 2 percent over a 40-year
horizon.
The rate of return guarantee is specified annually by the supervisory board
for private pension funds and, as in the Chilean case, provides for both upper
and lower limits on returns. This setup implies that the government is guar-
antor of last resort and participates in upside as well as downside risks. When
the rate falls short of the minimum, the difference is made up from pen-
sion fund reserves and further backed by an industry-wide guarantee fund,
financed by mandatory contributions from pension funds and backstopped
by the government. Returns exceeding maximum rates set by the supervis-
ory board serve to boost pension fund reserves. The industry-wide guarantee
fund also backs the minimum benefit guarantee. As elsewhere, the portfolio
composition of Hungarian pension funds is subject to regulation.
The guarantees for the DC portion of the Hungarian pension system
impose fairly limited risks on the government, due to the self-insurance
mechanism for pension funds against return fluctuations and the mod-
est returns necessary to generate sufficient wealth in pension accounts to
avoid calling the minimum benefit guarantee. Of course, the government
maintains its commitment to the fairly large DB pillar. In light of the retire-
ment income derived from the first pillar, it would appear that the DC
guarantees are intended to instill confidence in workers unfamiliar with an
investment-based pension system.
In Poland, the unfunded DB first pillar was replaced with an unfunded
notional DC system. Under a notional DC system, retirement accounts are
credited with a fictitious rate of return, although no assets are actually
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accumulated. The second pillar of the Polish system is a mandatory DC
system financed with a payroll tax worth 7.3 percent of salary. The govern-
ment guarantees a minimum pension of around 30 percent of the average
wage from both pillars. In addition, the second pillar is covered by a relative
rate of return guarantee similar to Chile’s, except that restrictions regarding
deviations from average rates are less stringent. Similar to the Hungarian
case, the minimum rate of return guarantee is backed by a guarantee fund,
which in turn is backed by the government, the ultimate guarantor. Polish
law also imposes restrictions on pension fund portfolios.
As in Hungary, the ultimate rationale for multiple guarantees is unclear.
Although these guarantees do not expose the government to excessive risks,
given the participation of the government in upside risks, they seem unne-
cessary given the importance of the first pillar. Put differently, since the first
pillar prevents people from being exposed to very low retirement income,
one might ask whether the second pillar guarantees and the related port-
folio restrictions to limit risk exposure are necessary. It is worth noting that
Sweden, which served as an example for several Baltic and Eastern European
states, did not add further guarantees to the promises made under the first
pillar when it designed its mandatory second pillar DC plan.
Conclusion
Our review has identified a wide variety of pension systems with a mandat-
ory DC component, and most of these include guarantees. In many cases,
governments have opted for multiple guarantees, limiting the fluctuation of
returns in individual accounts and setting a minimum for the benefits paid
in retirement. The minimum income promises are in some countries con-
tingent on pension fund performance, while in others they simply derive
from the pay-as-you-go DB tier.
DC guarantees must be affordable in order to be credible. Too generous
guarantees on investment returns or minimum benefits expose retirees to
the political risk that governments may have to scale back payments if finan-
cial pressures rise in later years. In that respect, DC plans with guarantees
may begin to look similar to traditional DB systems.
When guarantees are contingent on the investment outcomes, such as
minimum rate of return guarantees and topping-up of investment accounts,
governments have generally implemented risk management tools to limit
their risk exposure. These tools include reserves, mandatory pension
self-insurance, and restrictions placed on the composition of pension invest-
ment portfolios. Safeguarding public resources has tended to imply that rate
of return and minimum pension guarantees come at the cost of limitations
on portfolio choices.
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Notes
1The World Bank (1994) has proposed a three-pillar system. The first pillar is a pay-
as-you-go financed benefit and it provides some basic retirement income or income
guarantee. The second pillar is a mandatory DC plan, and the third pillar comprises
voluntary savings plans. More generally, the first pillar includes not only standard
DB pensions but encompasses all kinds of guarantees, means-tested benefits etc.
that the government may offer to keep people above a certain minimum level of
retirement income.
2Pension guarantees in voluntary pension system are discussed by Turner and Rajnes
(Chapter 12, this volume).
3Charging a premium should not be confused with those reform proposals attempt-
ing to reduce risk exposure by simply raising the contribution rate to individual
accounts. In the latter case, the expected account balances and payouts will increase
because higher contributions generate higher retirement savings. By contrast, an
insurance fee paid to the government is paid in return for the insurance provided
and thus would not increase available retirement savings.
4Smetters (2002) discusses risk management through limiting guarantees to the
returns of a standardized portfolio rather than offering a blanket minimum return
guarantee. As a result, the insurance value of the guarantee declines and moral
hazard to increase risk exposure is reduced because the guarantor participates in
only some of the downside risks.
5Smetters (1998) shows that guarantees can be exactly equivalent to unfunded liabil-
ities. The economic argument relies on the ex ante value of guarantees, which can be
evaluated with the options pricing formula. Under certain specifications, the value
of the insurance against downside risks of pension account protfolios can be exactly
equivalent to the promise made under a pay-as-you-go system. In that case, even
though notionally the government may have shifted from a DB to a DC system, the
value of its promise has not declined and future taxpayers remain exposed to the
same financial risks.
6See CBO (1999) for a more detailed overview of the British system and the reforms
introduced in the 1980s.
7Diamond and Valdés-Prieto (1994) provide a detailed overview of the features of
the Chilean system. Mitchell and Barreto (1997) discuss successor reforms in other
Latin American countries.
8This risk is akin to the risk of a large corporation whose workers have invested
most of their retirement savings in company stocks, with the important difference
that sovereign government default is much less likely than the failure of a private
enterprise. For a discussion of risk exposure in company pension plans see Mitchell
and Utkus (Chapter 3, this volume).
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